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STATfl1ENT OF KIND OF CASE

This is an appeal fran a conviction of and sentencing for

~

counts

of automobile homocide.
DISPOSITION IN LCWER CDURI'
A jury follild the Defendant guilty of each of

two counts of automobile

homocide and the Court sentenced the Defendant-Appellant to tVK) indeterminate
sentences of Q-5 years at the Utah State Prison, the sentence to run con=rently.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL

Defendant-Appellant seeks a reversal and a new trial and, if that relief
is not granted to order the District Court to resentence the Defendant on
only one count.
FAcrS
On the 27th day of July, 1977 the Defendant was the driver of a truck

which collided with a motorcycle upon which Ronald Beck and Michael K. Hansen
were riding,

(T-6,T-25).

The latter tVK) were killed.

There was a passenger

with the Defendant who testified at trial, Robert Michaell Greenwood (T-l to T-14).
The truck rolled over after the collision which caused injuries to the Defendant and Greenwood. (T-8,-lO,T-35).

And there was evidence that the Defendant

was in shock for several hours thereafter.

(T-10, T-16, T-35, T-61).

After the Defendant and Greenwood got out of the truck they left the
scene with a witness, David N. Jones (T-9,-10, T-17)
dropped off at his home. (T-10, T-13, T-18).

and the Defendant was

The only evidence presented at
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trial regarding the intoxication of the Defendant was that he was not
intoxicated prior to being taken home. (T-11, T-20).
The accident took place about 9;15 P.m.

(T-45, T-38).

At about 11:30 p.m ..

The Defendant rret Bob Greenhalgh, a witness, from the Utah Highway Patrol at
the American Fork Hospital (T-34) and permitted his blood to be witlrlrawn
for analysis (T-35).

The Defendant was then arrested by the witness Greenhalgh

for automobile homocide under the Utah Statute 76-5-207 U.C.A. (1953 as
amended).

(T-58)

On the following day officer Greenhalgh had the Defendant sign a waiver

of rights and discussed the previous day's events with him.

The officer then

reduced the statement to writing and the writing was introduced at trial (T-36,
T-49 and Exhibit No. 13).
In that staterrent the Defendant admitted he was the driver, stated he
had drank beer during the day, that his last beer was about 7:00 p.m. and that
he could remember nothing after the collision.

The witness GreenlM:Xld stated

that he and the Defendant and several other people drank about two gallons
of beer over the course of the day (T-4,5, T-11) and the Defendant had his
last beer at about 8:00p.m. (T-4,5).

And that the Defendant did not seem

intoxicated (T-11).
Over the objections of the Defendant the Court permitted evidence by
Dr. Albert D. SWensen, PH.D, about the blood alcohol results and the relating
of those results back to the time of driving (T-17).

For Coctor SWensen to

relate back, the State proposed hyfXltheticals using 8:30 and 7:00 as the time
for the last drink (T-77, T-78).
overruled.

The Defendant objected (T-77) and was

Dr. SWensen stated that if the last drink was at 10:00 p.m. he

could not calculate the tlocd atcohol level at the time of driving (T-79).
The Defendant
objected
anyforevidence
of his
intoxication
at
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the hospital including the introduction of the chemical test.

His objection

was based on the fact there was insufficient factual fourrlation to relate the
alcohol in his blood at the time of driving with his level of alcohol at
11:30 since, no one had testified regarding consumption during the intervening
period.

(T-54 thru

57, T-71).

The Court utilized a presumption to overrule

the objection that placed the Defendant in a position of producing evidence
to over come it.

(T-36).
ARGUMENT
I.

IN AN AU'I(M)BILE HOMXIDE ProsECUTION, lli ORDER TO UTILIZE THE PRESUMPTIONS
PROVIDED BY STATUrES 41-6-44 (b) and 41-6-44.5 U.C.A.

(as amended 1953), THERE

MUST BE FACTS OR INFERENCES BASED ON FACTS TO SHCW THAT THE BiroD ALCOHOL-LEVEL
AT THE TIME OF CHEMICAL TESTS IS BASED ON THE SAME CONSUMPTION OF ALCOHOL THAT
EXISTED AT THE TIME OF DRIVING.
In an automobile homocide case under Section 76-5-207 U.C.A.,

(1953 as

amended) a person is guilty if he operates a vehicle in a negligent rna.rmer
at the time he is "under the influence of intoxicating liquor. . . . to a degree
that renders the action incapable of safely driving a vehicle."

Subparag:r;aph

(2) of that section permits the District Court to utilize the presumptions listed
in 41-6-44 (b) U.C.A. (1953 as amended) to determine whether a driver is
presumed to be intoxicated.
Section 41-6-44 (b) states that certain well known presumptions exist
regarding the level of intoxication of a person, based on a measured level of
alcohol present in that person's blood at the time of extraction.
Section 41-6-44.5 U.C.A.

(1953 as amended) goes on to presume that if a

blood test is taken within one hour of the alleged incident then the results
are presumed to be the sarre as at the time of driving.
an

It if is IIDre than
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witness showing its probative value.

In either situation the state would

be required to show that the Defendant did nothing to alter the results of
his blood-alcohol level between times.

In otherwords, the statue is clearly

designed to meet the evidentiary problems of evidence caused by the changing
levels of blood alcohol over time in the human body where there is a necessary
delay between the act and the tests, not to substitute speculation for foundation.
For any evidence, and especially scientific evidence, to be admitted to
evidence there are preliminary questions that must be answered to determine if
they lend credence to the ultimate probative value of the evidence sought to
be admitted.

These are foundational to the evidence.

§53 (2nd Ed., 1972).

JltConnick on Evidence

The problem presented here is that no such foundation was

laid that the Defendant has consumed all of the alcohol reflected in his blood
test before he had the collision.

He clearly could have consumed same during

the alrrost two hours between the collision and the test with no one, including
the Defendant, being aware of it.

It is improper to assume a state of facts,

withoutany factual evidence to support the assumption, and, in the light of a
presumption of innocence, the burden is on the state to provide it.
In effect, what the District Court ruled was that absent evidence to the
contrary, a presumption arises that a person has nothing alcoholic to drink
after an accident and before the blood test.

In this instance, while saying

the burden of prcof does not shift, be indicated that for the Defendant to
prevail on the issue of intoxication, he must produce evidence negating the
presumption. (T-56) .

This has the effect of making a judicially imposed

presumption that cannot be supported by any surrounding facts.

In further takes

the form of a rebuttable presumption rather than s:iroply an inference.

This

ruling, the Court places the Defendant in a position of having the burden of
proof shifted to him, depriving the Defendant of the presumption of innocence
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of proof shifted to him, depriving the Defendant of the presumption of
innocence that is to prevail through the entire trial.

State v Patella

40 Utah 56, 119 Pac. 1023 (1911) and 76-l-501 U.C.A. (1953 as amended) and
denies his rights under the Fifth Amendment of the United States Gonstitution
and under Article I, Section 12 of the Gonsititution of the State of Utah which
protects him from the compulsion of testifying against himself or giving
evidence against himself.
The defect in the presumption in this case is there are no evidentiary facts
upon which to base it.

To sorre extent, the law in Utah is, evidentiary matters,

" .... one presumption or inference cannot rest upon another rrere inference on
presumption.
p. 1028.

It can only rest on proven facts."

State v Patella, 119 Pac. at

That rule is not absolute, oowever, and was at least rocx:l.ified in

State v Hall

105

u.

162, 145 P. 2d 494 (1942).

a New York case [citation omitted]

The Gourt there quoted from

in stating the standard to be applied if

an inference is based on an inference.
The rule is not that an inference may never be based on an inference but,
" ... rather than [sic] the prior inferences must be
established to the exclusion of any other reasonable
theory rather than merely be a probability, in order
that the last inference of the probability of the
ultimate fact may be based thereon." 145 P. 2d at
p. 497.
Under either standard the presumption indulged by the District Cburt was
impermissible and constitutes prejudicial error.

There is no logical reason

to expect that a person in the circumstances of the Defendant would not

any alcohol after a collision.

drink

Nor are there any "proven facts" upon which to

base an inference.
This Gourt further definedan inference , which, giving any benefit of
doubt to the State, the District Gourt utilized, in a civil case, Wyatt v
Baughman
121 U. 98, 239 P. 2d 193 (1951). The Court stated 239 P. 2d 198:
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An "inference"or what is, as we have seen, frequently

called a "presumption of fact" is a logical and reascnable
conclusion of the existence of a fact in the case, not
presented by direct evidence as to the existence of the
fact itself, but inferred from the establishment of other
facts from which, by the pr=ess of logic and reascn,
based upon carm:m experience, the existence of the assurred
may be concluded by the trier of the fact.
There were no facts presented at trial from which "through the pr=ess
of logic and reascn, based on =mon experience, the existence of the assurred
fact may be concluded by the trier of fact."

Without scme sort of testimony

about the tendencies of mankind to drink after a tragic accident can we
assume that tendency is to drink?

The only evidence regarding intoxication

at the t:im2 of driving is that the Defendant was not intoxicated. (T-ll,T-20)
When the presumptions and inferences allowed under the relevant statutes
41-6-44 and 41-6-44.5 U.C.A. are admitted to evidence based on an inference or
presumption not grounded on a proven fact or common experience, the reliability
of the conclusion is seriously in question.

In fact the witness who testified

pursuant to those statutory requirEments stated that a last drink, after the
collisio~

driving.

made it impossible to determine the alcohol level at the time of
(T-79)

The Court errored in admitting evidence, not based on fact

and allowing the statutory presumptions to be based on that lack of evidence.

(See: Inferences based on inferences 5-ALR 3d 100, Sec. 13)
In anticipation of the response hereto, this case is distinguishable from
cases involving the relating back of evidence of intoxication to the time of
driving, (e.g State v Sutliff 97 Eda. 523, 547 P. 2d 1128 (1976,)State v Cannon
404 P. 2d 971. 17 u. 2d 105 (1965) and State v Bradley (unreported) Utah
SuprEme Court No. 15307, filed April 17, 1978.

In none of these cases has the

queaion regarding consumption of al=hol after the driving been involved.

In each,

but for the physcial action of the body, the al=hol content was un=ntested as to
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the source of al=hol in the blcx:x:1stream.
Although in this case the state v-Duld have had a difficult, if not
impossible, task to obtain a conviction, that is not a reason to assume facts
based on no evidence. If that were the case, then facts necessary to prove
a case beyond a reasonable doubt could always be provided by the device of
inventing a presumption.
The creating of the presumption in this case may not be supported by
public policy.

The sparcity of cases wherein an issue of this nature presents

itself v.Duld suggest mre information is needed than is presented here.

The

Court's decision on this issue does not take into account the mtivation for a
Defendant leaving the scene of an accident, his mental state motivating the
leaving of the scene or any distinguishable factors.

A rule of law should have

a broader application than just one case.
II.

IT WAS IMPROPER FOR THE COURT TO IMPa3E 'IWO SENTENCES FOR AUIOM)BILE
HOMXIDE \'JHERE THERE \VAS ONLY ONE ACT BY THE DEFENDANT AND THERE WAS NO
SHewiNG OF INTENT TO HARM ANY PERSON.
The Defendant was charged with tv-D counts of autorrobile harocide, but
was sentenced to two terms of 0-5 years at the Utah State Prison, the terms
to run concurrently.
for both counts.

The evidence presented at trial necessarily was synonamous

There is nothing in the facts to indicate any severance or

divivibility of the acts alleged in those counts.
Section 76-l-402(1) U.C.A. (1953 as amended) forbids sentence, as imposed
here, for separate offenses arising out of the same incident.

That section

says:
A Defendant may be prosecuted in a single criminal action
for all separate offenses arising out of a single criminal
episode; however, when the same act of a Defendant under a
sinqle criminal episode shall establish offenses which may
Sponsored by the S.J.
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of this code, the act shall be punishable urrler only
one such provision; an acquittal or conviction and sentence
under any such provision bars a prosecution under any
such provision.
Pursuant to that section the Defendant should only receive one sentence.
In an criminal case that is tased on negligence rather than on intentional
acts there is no logic in double sentences.

In a multiple victim crime such

as robbery, murder or assault logic states that there is a concious choice to
camnit the act against each of the victims.

But where, as is our case, the

Defendant committed only one negligent act and only wasconvicted of one act
of being intoxicated, it is unfair and illogical to sentence him for rrore
acts.
In Dawson v State 266 So. 2d 116 (Fla. 1972) the Supreme Court of Flordia
set aside one sentence of manslaughter where two victims riding in the same
autorrobile were killed and the Defendant was convicted and sentenced on tw::l
counts.

A similar result took place in Wyoming where a Deferrlant shot into

a car containing 5 victims.

He was convicted of 5 counts but only sentenced

for one aggrevated assault.

Vig_:L_l~

State \'7yo. 563 P. 2d lll7 (1977) see also:

State v Little 19 u. 2d53, 426 P. 2::14 (1967) (Convicted of robbery and larceny,
only sentence

for robbery pennitted);

People v M:::Farland 26 Cal. Rptr. 473,

373 P. 2d 449 (Calif., 1962) (Burglary and larceny only one sentence);

People

v Duran Colo., 515 P. 2d 1117 (1973).
In the case of Ladner v U.S.358 U.S. 169, 3L.Ed 2d 199, 79 S.Ct. 209
(1958) the United States Supreme Court ruled that where a person fired a single
blast from a shot gun, wounding two Federal officers, is but one assault.

The

Court's rationale being that if two victims consitute two separate assaults
then the same would hold for fine.

The Court felt that because of the nature

of an assault, it would be unfair, resulting in potential sentences totally
disproportionate to the act of assault.

The same is mere true where an act
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of negligence is all that is necessary.
The Court should remand the case to the District Court for the
vacation of one sentence.
CDNCLUSION

This case should be reversed and remanded to the Fourth District Court
for retrial.

Prejudicial and reversible error was ccrnnitted when the Court

admitted the result of blood-alcohol analysis into evidence by utilizing a
statutory presumption of intoxication to rest on a presumption or inference
that was not based on any facts in evidence.

I t must be shotm, in order to

utilize statutory presumptions of intoxication in an automobile homocide case,
that the Defendant constnned no additional alcohol between the time of driving
and the time of the blood upon which the presumption was based

was extracted.

In the event the above relief is denied, one of the tv.o sentences imposed
should be vacated it being double punishment for the same criminal act.

I

I

I
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I
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Attorney for the Appellant
I

-9-

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

CERI'IFICATICN OF MAILING

I do hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing document has been
mailed, via United States Mail, postage prepaid to the follCMing individuals:

Robert B. Hansen, Utah Attorney General, State Capital Building, Salt Lake
City, Utah

84114, Craig Barlow, Deputy Attorney General, State Capital

Building, Salt Lake City, Utah
County Building, Provo, Utah

84114, Noall Wooton, Utah County Attorney,
84601, and Gary H. \veight, Deputy County

Attorney, County Building, Provo, Utah

84601 on this

1

I

day of May, 1978.

·

/
I,

'

-lo-

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

